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The Use of False Documents and Identities
in the former USSR
Stephen R. Bowers
Mousafar A. Olimov
Viorica Vladeca
Valeria Ciobanu
Executive Summary
- The false document trade is prevalent in three areas: counterfeiting of passports and identity cards,
creation of false documents for vehicle sales, and education certifications.
-
- The false document trade facilitates the movements of terrorists from Afghanistan and Somalia through
Tajikistan and toward the West via Moldova.
- Destabilization of the situation in Central Asia after the collapse of the USSR was an impulse for the
growth of criminality, in particular for the increase of illegal immigration and the related falsification of
all kinds of documents.
- Through the use of false documents, Tajikistan has become a major transit route for the Afghan migration
toward the West.
- The use of false identity and military cards of different law-enforcement bodies and other internal
security organizations is commonplace in the Former USSR.
- With the use of special equipment, including computers, forgers can make and sell international and
national passports as well as higher education diplomas.
- Another way of document falsification is changing data on passport holders by introducing changes in
passports. Imperfect technologies for producing national documents make this relatively easy to do.
- Ministry of Interior officials help in selling false documents, thus facilitating an increase in the activities
of criminal groups in Central Asia. The transport of both narcotics and illicit pharmaceuticals is sustained
by false documents.
- False documents are used to facilitate illegal migration, international prostitution, the harboring of
criminals, and economic crimes.
- The need for false documents to support terrorist operations has led to closer relations between terrorists
and the criminals who can deliver such documents.
- Internal and international passports, military identifications, and education diplomas are routinely bought
and sold, usually with the help of state employees.
- The poor coordination of law-enforcement activities of the neighboring Central Asian states also defeats
most governmental efforts to curb false document production.
- The measures by state structures against falsification of documents are ineffective in the face of economic
adversity, civil conflict and refugee crisis.
F a l s e D o c u m e n t s a n d I d e n t i t i e s i n t h e f o r m e r U S S R
 C e n t e r f o r S e c u r i t y a n d S c i e n c e 
2
False Documents and Identities in the Former USSR
Introduction
With the emergence of international terrorism as a major security concern for the
United States, authorities have recognized the key role of false documents and identities
in terrorist activities. The falsification of documents in the former Soviet Union (FSU) is
a common phenomenon that is approaching epidemic proportions. The increase in
counterfeiting is related to the social and economic isolation following the breakdown of
the Soviet Union as well as to the widespread poverty. Because the average monthly
salary is only about $30 and employment opportunities are scarce, citizens are breaking
the law simply to survive. Under-regulation in the financial-banking sector, as was noted
in a study of Ukraine, created opportunities for numerous abuses such as counterfeiting of
money, bills of sales, bank guarantees, and other documents. 1 This situation has had a
great impact on popular attitudes toward criminal activities. According to police officials
in the former Soviet Union, almost any kind of document can be falsified today.
Underground false identity producers can create a wide range of identifications including
simple identity cards, passports, diplomas, bills, labor contracts, passports, and visas.
These forms of identification are used for anything from tax evasion to actions generating
serious human rights violations. According to a 2004 Russian television program entitled
Honest Detective,"The false documents market operates in three main areas: first,
counterfeiting of passports, registration forms, immigration forms and identity cards. This
is the most profitable and lucrative part of the black market business. The second area is
the sale of false vehicle documents. The third is education certificates and diplomas,"2
In January, 2006, a United Nations report on the problem of prostitution in
Eastern Europe noted that the false document trade was essential to transferring East
European prostitutes into the European Union. 3 According to Willy Deridder, the
Executive Director of the Interpol General Secretariat, the vigilant security environment
associated with the global war on terror has created a greater demand for the stolen or
forged identity documents needed to facilitate operational travel and the building of
'sleeper' cells in the West. Deridder maintains that this need will generate closer contacts
between terrorist groups and the regular criminals who can deliver false documents.4
1 Todd Foglesong and Peter Solomon, Jr. , Crime, Criminal Justice, and Criminology in Post-Soviet
Ukraine, Washington, DC: US Department of Justice-Office of Justice Programs, 2001, p. 38
2 “Russia TV's "Honest Detective" taps into false document trade”, Financial Times (London), 12
November, 2004
3 “The Case of Poland”, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 26 January 2006,
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/trafficking_projects_poland.html
4 Interpol: Speech by Willy Deridder at the 17th Asian Regional Conference, 22 February 2002,
www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/speeches/20020218.asp
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In the Soviet era, Central Asia and the Soviet southwestern borderlands were
recognized as being among the best places to live in the USSR. The pleasant climate and
congenial atmosphere made these regions not only the preferred retirement home for
many Russians, especially those in the military. Service in these areas also constituted
important steps in the political ladder ascended by individuals such as Leonid Brezhnev
and Constantin Chernenko, both of whom were at one point first secretary of Moldova’s
communist party while Brezhnev also served in Kazakhstan as first secretary. Yet, these
regions also had, among Soviet circles, a reputation for corruption. Some would say this
was a result of its more relaxed atmosphere while others suggest that it was a result of
Russian influence. In Central Asia, Uzbekistan emerged as the site of a great controversy
involving a Brezhnev family member who was Deputy Minister of Interior while in the
southwest borderlands few places reached the level of corruption attributed to Moldova.
Whatever the reasons for the emergence of this reputation, it has endured.
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Moldova have been the focus of attention among those who
study corruption and crime in the FSU while Central Asia in general is noted for money
laundering services provided by hotels and casinos.5 One of the most widely discussed
features of crime in the former USSR is the creation of false documentation that will
support the performance of various illegal actions. This study will focus on both
Tajikistan and Moldova as case studies that demonstrate the manner in which this can be
accomplished.
Creating and Maintaining False Documents
Post-Soviet violence and lawlessness created an environment in which there was a
recognized need for falsified documents. Much of the post-communist world was plagued
by ethnic strife, economic adversity, and political dissension. From Moldova in the
FSU’s southwest borderlands to Tajikistan in Central Asia, conflict became the norm.
The Tajik civil war, which began in 1992, resulted in an abrupt increase in crime in
Tajikistan with an unprecedented rise in the production and distribution of false
documents. Reports by journalists and interviews with representatives of law-
enforcement bodies indicate that practically every kind of documents has been falsified
during the past decade.
Passports: In recent years, the most important civil document – the passport, has
more often been subject to different illegal “operations”. Not only Tajik internal but also
Tajik international passports are being falsified.
Numerous reports have exposed ongoing criminal actions associated with the
forging of documents in Tajikistan, where individuals or organized criminal groups forge
and sell the republic’s internal and foreign passports by hand or with the use of computer
equipment. Corruption among government officials has facilitated such activities.
According to Tajikistan’s Security Ministry Public Relations Center, “In October 1999,
the law-enforcement bodies prevented activities of a criminal group. For a long period, A.
5 Justin Peay, “A Post-Communist Nation Loses Its Way”, The International Herald Tribune, 16 June
2000, p. 2
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B. Mazganov, a government employee, and his accomplices B. B. Nabiev, G. Khasanov
and others were involved in making and selling of Tajik internal and foreign passports,
diplomas of different higher education institutions and different types of ID cards, thus
facilitating the legalization of many foreigners on the territory of our country”. 6
Law-enforcement bodies in Sogdi Oblast stopped the illegal activities of a
prominent criminal group. Criminal proceedings were instituted by the Oblast
Prosecutor’s Office against the gang headed by S. Olimdzhonov, the Vnesekonombak
Khodjent Branch senior economist. Olimdzhonov and his partners forged the stamp and
other relevant documentation of the Russian Federation Consulate General in the city of
Khodjent. In order to do this, they used with the computer equipment of the bank in
which Olimdzhonov worked. Using this stamp, the group made the necessary marks in
the passports of citizens of Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republics, which cost each “client”
from 400 to 1000 Russian Rubles. 7
A more common method of passport forgery is the falsification of data about the
passport holders by simply making changes in the passport. Often this involves the
replacement of the passport holder’s photograph. This can easily be done because of a
technological peculiarity of the new Tajik internal passports, where the passports are
stamped above a laminated surface which covers the photograph of the owner. When
placed in a freezing chamber, the photograph easily comes off in 15 to 20 minutes, and
can be replaced. The replacement cannot be visually identified, as the stamp does not
have a deep imprint on the photograph. The most common and widespread passport
forgery in Tajikistan occurs when Tajik citizens sell their passports to buyers and then
report them as lost. They are able to get a new passport from the Ministry of Interior
(MOI) when they file a statement claiming a loss. Information about the number of lost
passports indicates the scale of this new kind of “business”. In 1999, 5,340 Tajik national
passports were reported lost in the Sogdi Oblast alone. In 2000, 4,945 residents of this
Oblast reported lost passports, and 3,975 persons reported the same within 9 months of
2001. The Sogdi Oblast First Deputy Prosecutor Fozildjon Okhunov has reported that
individuals claiming to have lost passports are rarely ever reprimanded. Moreover, most
of those who have lost their passports obtained new ones within a short period without
any investigation, a practice which is contrary to the Tajik law on passports. Some
individuals received new passports the same day they reported the loss. (see Appendix 1
for specific cases) There even are instances in which citizens obtained new passports two
and even three times a year. (see Appendix 2 for specific cases) All these facts indicate
the level of corruption in the Interior Ministry bodies, particularly in passport services. 8
Obtaining False Passports The illegal issuance of passports is typically caused
by (1) the poor control of MOI bodies over the process, (2) by the corruption of agencies
responsible for issuing passports, or (3) by some combination of corruption and
inefficiency. The primary method of obtaining false passports is through buying and
selling. Sometimes Tajik citizens illegally obtain passports from the Interior Affairs
6 “Security Forces Inform…”, Vecherny Dushanbe, 28 April 2000
7 Tajikistan Newspaper, Dushanbe, 29 Nov 2001
8 Tajikistan Newspaper, Dushanbe, November 29, 2001
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Departments of city or district Khukumats or simply through outright bribery of relevant
officials. The greatest emphasis is on buying or selling of official Tajik internal and
foreign passports by ordinary citizens, Passport Services officials on the one hand and
consumers on the other hand. The exchange is made directly and through mediators. In
the latter case such illegal operations as a rule are made by a group of people, including
Passport Services or MOI representatives. (see Appendix 3 for specific cases)
There are instances in which passports are given to citizens residing in other
districts and even in other countries. (See Appendix 4 for specific cases) Some former
residents of this district, who earlier immigrated to other countries and returned
temporarily, have received new passports in the former place of their residence without
processing relevant documents. (See Appendix 5 for specific cases) Sometimes Tajik
passports are illegally given to CIS citizens. (See Appendix 6 for specific cases) The
casual practices with regard to issuance of passports are, in part, a result of the difficulties
in identification of Soviet citizens in the Newly Independent States. It is also a
consequence of the new states’ inabilities to create border-guard and immigration control
procedures in the post-Soviet states. There are also problems with multiple citizenships.
These occur when people either legally or illegally obtain citizenship and passports of
several post-Soviet states. As a rule, these are states in which they have relatives or
business and where they are labor migrants.
A 2004 Europol report noted that a major source of identity modification in the
former USSR is tourist agencies. Almost all the former-Soviet republics acknowledge
that this is a problem. As Soviet authority collapsed, numerous tourist “ghost-agencies”
sprang up to offer so-called tourist services before the police could shut them down.
There were cases in which agencies issued visas for citizens and then disappeared
immediately after receiving payment from the clients. Later these visas proved to be
false. Some victims not only lost their money but were arrested as well. According to the
Moldovan Ministry of Internal Affairs, in January 2001 alone there were 1,341 registered
enterprises that had international tourist services in their charter. Only 307 of them had
licenses to practice such an activity and only 128 economic agents out of the total number
of 1,341 registered at the beginning of the year actually presented their documents for
registration.9
Illegal Migration of Afghans The falsification of Tajik passports, higher
education diplomas and identity cards is commonly used in both the legalization of
foreigners in Tajikistan as well as in illegal transit migration. The Afghan migration,
which began in 1997, causes the biggest influx of illegal migrants into Tajik territory. As
a result of the deterioration of the situation in Northern Afghanistan in 1997, the flight of
Afghans into Tajikistan became a major problem. Most of them do not register with the
refugee organizations but simply move on to third countries. Tajikistan is now a major
center for the Afghan transit migration to other CIS countries, Western Europe, the USA
and Canada. Most Afghans do not wait for the State Migration Services decision on their
refugee petitions; they generally leave Tajikistan for other CIS states, especially Moldova
9 “Trafficking in Human Being for Sexual Exploitation in the EU: A Europol Perspective”, 23 October
2004, www.europol.eu.int/publications
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which is the final stop before entering the West. In the spring of 2002, the State
Migration Services reported that about half of asylum-seekers were no longer in
Tajikistan and their whereabouts were unknown. Most Afghans travel from Tajikistan to
the West by illegal international networks that have agents in all institutions dealing with
migrants. 10
Russian journalists have reported that “in Tajikistan, one can buy false passports
at $100, and that Kazakh border-guards detained more than 100 Afghans with false Tajik
passports in the Moscow-Bishkek train.” As authorities searched the sources where
Afghans obtain false passports they found that passport trading is a thriving business.
This practice has existed since the beginning of the Afghan flight into Central Asia
began. Some of them took the legal way: via registration of citizenship, obtaining a
“propiska”. Others resorted to the easier illegal way.” (See Appendix 7 for specific cases)
Russian investigative bodies have identified the procedures for obtaining false
passports.11
Some illegal immigrants who have obtained false Tajik passports choose
Tajikistan as place of their permanent residence. Others use the illegally obtained
documents for further migration. “Depending on the country they wish to move to, the
clients pay from $1,500 to $5,000 or even $6.000 to get airplane tickets, false passports
and visas. After boarding their flights, the migrants destroy the documents. When they
land at the airport they approach relevant officials in order to request asylum.”12
Dual Citizenship Dual citizenship is widely sought by many individuals involved
in criminal activities and may be illegally obtained in two ways. First, illegal migrants
who have bought false passports obtain it. These are mostly Afghans who use false Tajik
documents for transit via Tajikistan to further CIS countries, USA, Canada and Western
Europe countries. Sometimes they take the advantage of the “Agreement on Double
Citizenship” between Russia and Tajikistan and with their Tajik passports they receive
Russian Federation passports, sometimes real and sometimes false. They go to Moscow,
procure visas and then move to third countries. “It influences the cost of illegal
transportation. Thus, the travel from Tajikistan (via Tashkent) to Western European
countries costs Tajik citizens some $1,500 ($500 for the passport, $500 for visa, $300 for
a ticket and the rest is honoraria for the senders). For Afghan citizens, the same route
would cost $5,000”. 13
Second, there are countless attempts to obtain dual (Tajik and Russian) citizenship
by Tajik citizens and citizens of other CIS countries (mostly by Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan) who intend to move to Russia as labor migrants or “shuttle traders”. Such
individuals traveling to the Russian Federation were the main clients of the organized
10 S. Olimova. “Tajikistan is the first stop on the way of Afghan migration”, Central Asia and the Caucasus
Magazine, No. 1, 1998
11 “How much costs …the motherland? Or the new business on passport trading”, Krim-Infor (Dushanbe),
November 1, 2003
12 S. Olimova. “Tajikistan is the first stop on the way of Afghan migration”, Central Asia and the Caucasus
Magazine, 1998, No. 1
13 Ibid.
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Fake graduation documents
group in Khudzhand. With a forged stamp of the Russian Federation Consulate General
this group made the necessary marks in the passports of Tajik and Kyrgyz citizens, which
cost each “client” from 10 to 1,000 Russian Rubles. 14
The Role of Universities An essential element in the creation of false identities is
the counterfeit documentation of academic achievements. In post-communist East
Europe, phony academic certificates can be used to accomplish two objectives. The first
and least sinister is professional advancement. The second and more ominous objective is
the creation of a completely new identity for individuals who are avoiding prosecution
for previous criminal activities or are currently engaged in criminal endeavors. Several
officials of the Dniester Moldovan Republic have been identified in this connection.
A willing and available university is required for accomplishment of either of the
above objectives. Many well-established universities have been mentioned in this
connection. Widespread international attention was focused on Moldova’s Free
Independent University of Moldova after Romania’s prominent Ecological University,
one of the several independent universities to appear in the wake of the collapse of the
communist regime in 1989, was implicated in the sale of advanced degrees in dentistry.
ULIM’s activities first came to the attention of the Romanian National Council for
Academic Evaluation and Accreditation when it was accused of granting doctoral degrees
without state authorization15. As the National Council investigated the activities of the
Ecological University it charged that ULIM was also issuing doctoral degrees in return
for participation in a four-week “training program” and payment of a generous amount of
money. 16 Most widely commented upon was ULIM’s doctorate in economics, a
document that, according to Romanian investigators, was being utilized by many
individuals hoping to either advance themselves professionally or to establish new
identities. 17
The practice of bribing professors to document
academic accomplishments is closely related to the
outright falsification of academic credentials. In 2002,
Moldova’s Prime Minister Vasily Tarlev addressed
this concern in a meeting with representatives of the
Ministries of Justice and of Education. According to
PM Tarlev, the Moldovan government will establish a
special body to combat fraud in the university system.
In the past, such activities were generally ignored and
even in the event of exposure, perpetrators were not
subject to criminal prosecution. 18
14 Tajikistan Weekly (Dushanbe), 29 Nov 2001
15 “Scandallul diplomelor false da in clocot”, Ziua (Bucharest), 27 February 2001
16 ‘Universitatea Ecologica ramane pe tusa : 19 universitati particulare din 20 pot primi acreditarea’ Ziua
(Bucharest), 31 October 2000.
17 “Diplome false de doctorat, eliberate de Universitatea Independenta Moldova”, Evenimentul Zilei
(Bucharest), 27 February 2001
18 “Premier Warning of University Bride-takers”, Infotag, May 30, 2002
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Using Documents in Connection with Criminal Activities A well-publicized
incident involving false passports occurred in March 2001 when Ukrainian authorities
reported that a group of six Moldovan citizens had been detained at the border between
Ukraine and Belarus after attempting to cross the frontier using false Ukrainian passports.
Police determined that the group’s final destination was Poland where they intended to
join with a criminal organization. In 1999, several Arab citizens were arrested on a
similar charge. A passenger flight from Chisinau to Prague was delayed in the Chisinau
airport because several passengers held Moldovan passports but had Arab features and
spoke no Romanian or Russian. The case was investigated by Moldova’s Security and
Information Service, which apparently was embarrassed by the incident and did not wish
to publicize details about the holders or producers of the documents. While
representatives in charge of the Ministry of Interior claimed that no false passports are
made in the Republic of Moldova they limited that assertion to only Moldovan passports.
Following the anti-Communist revolutions in the Eastern Europe, international
prostitution grew rapidly. During the Cold War, such trade was difficult and dangerous,
but in the last ten years the Western sex market has been increasingly supplied with
Eastern European women. Most of the women forced into working as prostitutes for
international criminal gangs are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. According
to the International Migration Organization, a half million women, mainly from Eastern
Europe, are brought to the European Union each year. Many of the girls are forced, others
know exactly what to expect in the West, but the majority of them are lured with various
promises that never materialize. Immediately after the Cold War the majority of these
women were from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, however today they are most
often from Russia and the former Soviet Republics. According to a 2001 survey
conducted by the International Migration Office mission in Tajikistan, the illegal
movement of women in order to force them into sexual or domestic slavery is one of the
most important migration problems.
Human traffickers have become increasingly specialized in providing
transportation, documents, accommodation, labor contracts and authority liaisons.
According to the Global Survival Network in Washington, Russian and other former
Soviet Union traffickers request no less than $1,500 and often as much as $30,000 for
these services, burdening the girls from the very beginning with large debts.
Police officials sometime take part in the international human traffic network. In
1996, the Chief of the Special Commission on the Organized Crime from Germany was
accused of facilitating the illegal traffic to Germany through Poland. In Belgium, one of
the most frequently used methods is the application for political asylum, a process that
lasts almost 8 months, during which the women are forced to practice prostitution, and
before a negative response concerning the political asylum is received, they are sent to
another place.
Authorities report that it is virtually impossible to stop criminal organizations
dealing with human traffic. Reasons for this include the fact that many of the Newly
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Fake IDs
confiscated
by police
Independent States have no laws regarding illegal human traffic. This is the case for both
Moldova and Tajikistan. The police say that they simply cannot fight such offenses,
because they have no authority to investigate or to punish them. Secondly, according to
the police, both Western governments and international institutions have no interest in
cooperating with the small countries in this matter. According to Lt. Mihai Marian,
deputy chief of the Criminal Police Department within the Moldovan Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MIA), 60% of the European prostitutes are Moldovan. He reported that it was
the Western countries that were trafficking in Moldovan women and enticing them to
become prostitutes. Tajik authorities report that their passports are among
the most widely falsified for prostitution traffic throughout Europe.19
Reports by journalists indicate that not only passports but also
almost all kinds of documents are being falsified on a large scale. Not
surprisingly, fugitive criminals rely heavily on the trade in illegal
documents to elude law enforcement. In 2005 accounts from Tajikistan’s
Gafurovsky District revealed that fugitives were able to apply directly to
the Ministry of Interior for new passports while those same officials were
involved in a widespread search for them. 20
The use of false identity and military cards of different law-
enforcement bodies and other internal security organizations has become a
routine matter. During the civil war and the long period of instability associated with that
conflict, armed men masqueraded in public as soldiers wearing camouflage without any
identifying insignia. This prevented the local militia from approaching them for
questioning. While committing crimes, Criminals used their false documents in the
commission of numerous crimes during this time. (See Appendix 9 for specific cases)
Economic Crimes Documents associated with the import of goods have a distinct
value and, like identity documents, are now being falsified throughout the former USSR.
Tajik authorities recently reported one such attempt. According to a news report, “The
hospitality of Tajik people is often used by foreigners in their selfish ends. Citizens of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan tried to take out to Kyrgyz Republic 24 tons of scrap-
iron and waste aluminum and 100 tons of diesel oil with false documents. And
representatives of a company belonging to an Austria citizen attempted to take out 300
tons of cotton fiber. However these illegal actions were prevented by Tajikistan Security
Services.” 21 Less well publicized are the many occasions when criminal successfully
employed false documents in order to undermine the economies of the post-Soviet states.
Counterfeiting identities also have an economic impact. The indirect damages
generated by document counterfeiting have contributed to serious economic and social
problems in Moldova. According to various statistics, between 600,000 and 1,000,000
19 Interview conducted by Viorica Vladeca in Chisinau.
20 Interview with Mumadamin Mumadaminov, Dushanbe, 18 April 2005
21 Vecherny Dushanbe, April 21, 2001
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Moldovan citizens work illegally abroad.22 The legal transfer of Moldovan workers
abroad is very difficult. It is virtually impossible for the average Moldovan citizen to
legally receive a visa from Western consular offices in the Republic of Moldova. Most
Western countries have implemented a policy of strict control of visa issuance. They also
have strict frontier control, close observation on mixed marriages, and criminal
background checks of third parties that facilitates the entrance. Because this trafficking
often involves organized crime, Western European countries have signed international
agreements and devoted significant resources to fighting illegal immigration. This “keep
out” approach is better at limiting immigration than protecting abused persons. The
illegal worker statutes, the absence of legal migration options, and the lack of job
opportunities seem to conspire against many citizens in the former USSR. These
circumstances force citizens to enter an illegal circuit without any protection against
violence or exploitation. The migration methods and the illegal status of the workers in
the destination countries make them dependent and vulnerable to various forms of abuse
and violence similar to slavery. Alan Hope, a journalist in Brussels who studied this
phenomenon, has concluded that there were many similarities between slavery and
emigration from Moldova. He argued there are two ways to keep a slave, or emigrant,
docile; the first is physical violence, however often this reduces the “owners” value. The
second is to threaten the emigrant concerning his or her alien status.
Combating the Falsification of and Trade in Documents
One of the main reasons for passport falsification in this case is the immigration
legislation of Middle Eastern countries. “The United Arab Emirate illustrates this
problem with its legislation in which women under the age of 31 are not allowed into the
country unless accompanied by their husbands or parents. Therefore the organizers of
women traffic resort to falsified documents where they change ages and sometimes
names. Survey respondents indicated that they were able to obtain falsified documents
including visa for as little as $259. 23 (See Appendix 8 for specific cases)
Both Tajikistan and Moldova have addressed this problem. Moldova, however,
faced with an uncontrolled frontier with the Dniester Moldovan Republic, has made less
progress. Tajikistan’s existing laws on combating the falsification and trade in documents
are divided into two categories: (1) the internationally ratified legal documents and (2)
the existing Tajik Criminal Code Articles. The importance of international documents in
the creation of a legal basis for the combating of document falsification is underlined in
Article 10 of the Tajik Constitution. Apart from stipulating the universal obligation to
respect the laws, it also underlines the prevalence of the internationally ratified over the
national laws.
22 To describe the facilitation of the illegal immigration of these workers, we have adopted the term of
“traffic” instead of “trade.” The use of the word “trade” would be inappropriate because, normally, it refers
to legal transactions. The human trade cannot be accepted in any possible way.
23 “Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan.” Survey of Woman and Children Traffic. International Migration
Office, July 2001, p. 21.
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In the Tajik Criminal Code there are a number of articles on combating document
falsification and trade. These are:
Article 282 – “Making and trading falsified credit cards and
other payment documents”
Article 266 – “Illegal issue of licenses for arms carrying and
storing”
Article 339 – “Theft and damage of documents and stamps”
Article 340 – “On documents, state awards and forms
falsification and trade”
Article 341 – “Obtaining and trading official documents and
state awards”
However it should be noted that the penalties for crimes connected with the
falsification of documents are rather lenient. (See Appendix 11 for specific cases)
Activities of Central and Local Tajik Authorities The increase of crimes related
to the falsification and trade in documents in recent years resulted in the adoption of a
number of measures on identification and prevention of such crimes. As a result of “The
Foreigner” Operation by the Ministry of Interior in 2000, documents were checked and
those involved in the falsification and trade of documents as well as illegal migrants were
apprehended. In 2000-2001, the Tajik Security Council repeatedly examined the situation
with falsified documents. The work of passport services in Sogdi Oblast was evaluated in
2000. As a result, numerous criminal proceedings were instituted and the MOI staff was
fired. As a result of the 2001 inspection, a number of high-ranking officials were
punished at the Tajik State Border Guards Committee.
When Tajik authorities seize false documents, this usually takes place during
border and customs checks at the frontier. The Tajik State Border Guard Committee (RT
SBC), and by the Russian Federation Federal Border Guard Services Group in Tajikistan
(the RF FBS BG) guard the Tajik border. For communication with other countries, the
list of four airport, 3 river and 2 road international border crossing checkpoints was
approved in Tajikistan by the Resolution of the Tajik Government. Apart from these, 17
temporary simplified crossing points were opened on the territory of the MBAO for the
delivery of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. In line with the Protocol “On the
order of carrying out border control at the checkpoints opened on the territory of Tajik
Republic for international communication” signed between Tajikistan and the Russian
Federation on 26 April 1997, the Russian Federation FBS border guard units are serving
at these points.
The Tajik SBC conducts border control activities in the two international airports
(Dushanbe and Khodzhent). In 2000, the Tajik SBC staff detained 61 trespassers at these
points. Another 265 individuals with false documents were detained the same year and
198 of them were not permitted to cross the border (information provided by the Tajik
SBC). In general, according to the information by the Tajik SBC, in 1998, Tajik airport
border guards detained many individuals who violated visa laws, 17 of them were Afghan
citizens. And in 1999 Tajik border guards detained 4 Irish citizens whom they suspected
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of having IRA ties. In 2000, 48 individuals were detained, among them 10 more Irish
citizens, 8 citizens of the Uzbek Republic and citizens of Iraq, Yemen and other
countries.
Deputy Head of Russian FBS group in Tajikistan Alexander Nikolaevich
Aksenkin said that “48 violators were detained within the seven months of the current
year (2000), 31 individuals were found with false and some with other people’s
documents, 203 with incorrect documents, and 159 of them were prohibited to cross the
border.” A. N. Aksenkin said that the number of attempts of illegal crossings of the state
border with false documents is increasing. There were no Consulate institutions of
foreign states, including the Russian Federation and Tajikistan in the IRA territory.
Therefore, the IRA citizens obtain documents permitting entrance into the Tajikistan or
Russian Federation or permissions for transit crossing of the Tajikistan border for further
travel to the Russian Federation and other countries such as Iran, Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia. For example, according to the Russian Federation SBC BG Press Center, on 15
February 2001, 3 IRA citizens who had arrived from Meshead (Iran) with false visas
were detained in Dushanbe airport. (See Appendix 12 for specific cases)
In connection with the increase of illegal migration, on 2 April 2001, the Tajik
President issued Decree No. 544 “On encouraging illegal migration combat in
Tajikistan”. This Decree envisages the introduction of migration control by the Tajik
SBC. A number of documents were worked out to become the legislative basis for the
implementation of immigration control at the Tajik borders. These include Supplement to
the Law “On the Republic of Tajikistan State Border” and “Statute of Immigration
Control”. Apart from criminal and legal measures, preventative measures are being taken.
Law-enforcement officials meet and talk to the general population. In addition, printed
materials are used for educational purposes.
Crimes related to the falsification of documents have flourished in this
environment due to the following factors: existing economic difficulties, a weakening of
the state as a result of the civil conflict, large number of refugees (1 million) and
internally displaced persons, high level of illegal migration, inadequate border crossing
and migration controls, passport system reform and poor control over the implementation
of laws related to the issue of documents, and the registration of citizens. The poor
coordination of law-enforcement activities of the neighboring Central Asian states also
defeats most governmental efforts to curb false document production.
Prospects for the Future
A 2003 study produced by Bulgaria’s Center for the Study of Democracy
observed that the inability to trust official documents constituted a threat to the
development of post-Communist East Europe.24 Official statements, journalistic reports,
and the accounts of private citizens demonstrate that the illegal use of false documents is
widespread throughout this region. In every state institution it is possible to find someone
24 “Corruption, Contraband and Organized Crime in Southeastern Europe”, Sofia: Center for the Study of
Democracy, 2003, p. 3, http://upan1.un.org
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who will sell documents for personal profit. Everything is being sold: from false higher
education diplomas to school-leaving certificates and military cards. This sad fact is
reflected in the criminal activities throughout the region. (See Appendix 10 for specific
cases)
The legal environment in Central Asia or FSU borderland regions such as
Moldova, twenty years after the remote outposts of Soviet power won their reputations
for genial corruption during the Brezhnev era, has changed little. A report issued by the
Berlin-based Transparency International, an independent group that attempts to measure
public perceptions about corruption, indicated that Moldova and Tajikistan now enjoys
the distinction of being among the most corrupt of the ninety-five nations studied. 25
While there are calls to combat the corruption that sustains the production of false
documents, little has been done to accomplish this ambitious goal. Suggestions to change
passport production technology in Tajikistan have yet to bring results.
Police officials and other public officials now acknowledge these nations
reputations for corruption. Following his re-election as President in 2005, Vladimir
Voronin declared his intention of reversing perceptions of Moldova’s legal
environment.26 When Voronin became President, not one case of corruption had reached
a courtroom in the ten years of Moldova’s independence. During a one-month period in
2000, three high ranking officials in tax services as well as a public prosecutor were
arrested on charges of bribe taking and embezzlement of public funds but none of the
accused went on trial. Perhaps in recognition of this situation, a public telephone hotline
was established to report incidents of perceived corruption on the part of public
officials.27
The situations of Moldova and Tajikistan, however, are not unique problems.
There are many connections between the newly independent states that were forged
during the Soviet era. Consequently, criminal elements here generally have criminal
partners in Moscow and elsewhere. Moreover, those same connections now extend into
Western Europe and North America. These illegal activities have an impact far beyond
the boundaries of these relatively obscure states. In 1999, Moldovan Minister of Interior
Victor Catan noted that his nation had become a transit point for criminals from Somalia,
Afghanistan, and other regions regarded as havens for violent gangs. The starting point
for this traffic was Central Asian states such as Tajikistan. Their final destinations, Catan
explained, are those Western cities that offer the promise of quick financial gain for
individuals willing to resort to violence and the growing market for recruits in terrorist
organizations.28 The false documents produced in Chisinau and Dushanbe continue to
facilitate the movement of members of organizations determined to exploit the freedom
and wealth of Western society and undermine the stability of the democratic states.
25 Basa Press (Chisinau), 14 October 2000
26 “Voronin Re-Elected President by Moldova's New Parliament”, The Moscow Times, 5 April 2005. P. 3
27 Basa Press (Chisinau), 17 June 2000.
28 Interview by Stephen Bowers with Victor Catan, Chisinau, October 5, 1999
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Appendix
1. Kh. Rakhimshekhov from Undji Village Council in Gafurovsky District
reported the loss of his passport on 27 July 2000, and received a new one the same day.
The case was the same with Nasim Khodjiboev, resident of Usmonova kishlak Council in
Gafurovsky District, who reported the loss of his passport on 5 May 2000 and obtained a
new one the same day, even without approval from the Head of the District Interior
Ministry Department.
2. For example, on 30 August 1999, Z. Kurbanov, Kistakuz Kishlak (Gafurovsky
District in Sogdi Oblast) resident obtained a new passport and less than 5 months later, on
January 5, 2000, he again reported the loss of his passport to the same Militia Department
and received a new one on the following day. And Yu Yergashev, resident of Isfisor
Kishlak in the same district lost and got new passports three times within a year.
3. For example, a resident of Usmonov Kishlak Council in Gafurovsky District
(Sogdi Oblast) Nazokat Sanginova who lost her passport in Tashkent obtained a new
passport in 1999 without even processing new documents or visiting the IMD, via an
acquaintance by paying 250 Russian Rubles. And another resident of this district, Zarrina
Khudoidova obtained a new passport in the same way but a bit more expensive – paying
400 Russian Rubles.
4. Gafurovsky District MOI Department issued passports to citizens S. Zarembo,
N. Akhmedova, A. Toshev and M. Umarova who reside in other districts.
5. For example, resident of Ovchi Kalacha Kishlak in Gafurovsky District Maruf
Khodzhiev moved for permanent residence to Novokuznetsk City in Russian Federation
in 1998. Therefore he was registered out. However on 27 October 2000, he was given a
new passport without any verification. (“Tajikistan” Newspaper, 29 Nov 2001.)
6. For example, Khodzhent City MOI Department employee Sh. Yusufova abused
her position and issued Tajik passports to Republic of Uzbekistan citizen Sh.
Khamrokulova and Russian Federation citizen F. Malakhovsky on the grounds of false
documents. (“Tajikistan” Newspaper, 29 Nov 2001.)
7. The article brings several examples. Saidalishoh valadi Saidalishoh obtained a
new passport with the name of Tajik citizen Odin Ibragimov, 1956, issued by the Tajik
Gazimaliksky District Khukumat. There is an enterprising Afghan Muhammadkoid
valadi Muhammadsoleh, residing in Dushanbe as a refugee. He assists his countrymen in
obtaining false passports. For example, he was approached by Afghan Ahmad Chovid
valadi Hussain Ali, and he acquainted him with Anvar Kondakov, a pensioner who lives
in District No. 82. Anvar Kondakov took them to the market in the same district to meet
some “unidentified” persons who readily promised them to make Tajik passports for
$100. They only had to bring photographs. The skilled man handed them Tajik passports
at the same place and time a week later. This is the way Afghan Ahmad Chovid valadi
Hussain Ali received a passport with the name of Zaidov Siroyatullo Ismatulloevich,
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1976, issued by the Dushanbe Frunzensky Khukumat MOI Department. Father of four
children, Azizullo valadi Abdullo, 1970, obtained an old Soviet passport with the name of
Saidmuradov Dilovar Radjabovich, issued by Central District Executive Committee MOI
Department in 1993. They also falsified for a father of four children, Afghan Saidalishoh,
four birth certificates for his children and a passport for his wife Farizone
Muhammadaziz with the name of Urunova Malokhat, 1977, who died in 1999. At the
trial her brother Urunov Kobil said that her passport was handed to Oktyabrsky District
Registry Office. But it remains unclear how the passport of a dead woman had been taken
from the registry Office. Investigative bodies still have to find this out.
8. A specific case of obtaining and using falsified documents in women traffic
was described in the article “To Emirates in Search of Living” by Khamzali Muzaffarov,
the Tajik Prosecutor-General Office Senior Investigator for Particularly Important Cases,
published in the newspaper “Asia Plus” of 18 August 2000. The article tells about the
detention of three girls who were going to Dubai (Arab Emirates). They were detained in
Dushanbe airport on 19 January 2000 by law-enforcement bodies. Their age caused
suspicion: according to their documents, all of them were older than 30, but looked very
young. The check showed that the documents were false, and the three of them were
Khudzhanda City residents who had already repeatedly been prostituting in UAE. When
one of them had decided to go to the UAE to earn money she approached a mediator
woman who referred then to a woman in Dushanbe called Sevaroy. Sevaroy obtained for
them falsified documents at $250 and gave them the address of an underground brothel
owner in Dubai.
9. The article “Punish, Not to Forgive”, in the Vecherny Dushanbe Weekly of 29
September 2000 states that: “On 20 September, Dushanbe City Court examined the case
of Tajikistan citizen Rustam Ubaidulloev, 1958, who was charged with three Articles of
the Tajik Criminal Code. In 1998 he had committed a number of crimes using false Tajik
MOI documents and uniforms. This time he was convicted of criminal assault on a
member of the UN mission in Tajikistan”.
10. Here are several examples: “In a short while, Z. Shoev, 1978, residing in
Ispechak Street in Dushanbe obtained a military card. In the process of checking up it
was found out that in preliminary agreement, in August 2000 the Tajik Defense Ministry
Unit staff Kh. Ali and the Frunzensky District Registration and Enlistment Office
employee S. Rustam accepted from R. Shoev, 1953, a bribe of 400 Somoni. In return they
made and gave a falsified military card for his son. The investigation was carried out by
Frunzensky Khukumat MOI Department”. (“Krim-Infor” Weekly, 15 June 2001.)
“Dushanbe school No. 36 head of studies A. Boronov was detained on 30 May 2001.
According to the preliminary agreement with L. Dzhumaeva, Director of the
Kindergarten No. 125 in Zheleznodorozhny District, for 50 Somoni he made false school-
leaving certificate for her daughter N. Shakirova, 1986, so that this “schoolgirl” could
enter a higher education institution. The investigation was carried out by
Zheleznodorozhny Khukumat MOI Department”. (“Krim-Info”, 03 June 2001.) “As a
result of investigation by the Tajik MOI Economic Crimes Combat Department, on 27
Feb 2001, it was found out that in 1997, D. Lyudmila, assistant in Tajik State Medical
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University made for N. Isroilov a false university graduation diploma with qualification
in “Radio Physics and Electronics”. He was illegally appointed Deputy Director of Tajik
Communications Ministry Radio Center No. 1. The investigation was carried out by
Zheleznodorozhny District MOI Department”. (“Krim-Info”, 03 June 2001.)
11. For example, foreigners Ahmad Dzhovid valadi Hussain Ali, Azizullo valadi
Abdullo, Muhammad Koid valadi Muhammadsoleh, Saidalishoh valadi Saidalishoh and
Farzona Muhammadaziz and Tajik citizen Anvar Kondakov were sentenced to different
years of imprisonment according to Article 340, Part 2, Point “b”/ considering that
Saidalishoh and Farzona have under age children, they were released from imprisonment
and paid the fine of 300 and 800 Somoni respectively. (“Krim-Info”, 01 Jan 2001.) The
girls who had obtained falsified documents were sentenced from 2.5 to 3 years of
imprisonment under Article 335 of the Tajik Criminal Code (Illegal crossing of the state
border), i.e. for the falsification of documents.” (“Asia Plus”, 18 Aug 2000.)
12. On 30 June 2000, while checking documents, the Russian Federation border
guards detained 6 trespassers who arrived at Dushanbe from Meshead. They tried to enter
with passports issued by Central Passport Department of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of the unrecognized “Taliban” government. The
detained individuals also had highly professional falsified visas of the Russian Federation
for the route Tehran-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan-Moscow. The visas were stamped with
the falsified stamp of the Russian Embassy Consulate Department in the Islamic Republic
of Iran. All the detained IRA citizens aged from 25 to 30. The Russian FBS BG in
Tajikistan noted the high quality of the falsified documents. In the process of work with
the detained individuals, Tajik Security Ministry staff identified a criminal group
involved in the transfer of people to the West via CIS countries.” (“Vecherny Dushanbe”,
18 Aug 2000.)
“Asia-Plus” Weekly of 5 May 2000 wrote that “According to the information
provided by Russian Border guards Press service, as a result of border control of the
passengers of Dushanbe-Chorly-Munich international flight on 2 May 2000, there were
detained 8 people who headed to Germany. All of them had Kyrgyz Republic passports,
where some inaccuracies were noticed. As a result of questioning it became evident that
the detained individuals did not know Kyrgyz language, and all of them were IRA
citizens. The detained were passed to the Tajik Security Ministry for further
investigation”.
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